01.03.01 |
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Translation:
Dr. Nicola Rowe, Hamburg
48.
A.
Parallels between a constitution and the European
Communities’ founding treaties were noted very early on, and the
interpretation of those treaties was coloured accordingly. Ophüls
stressed that the Communities’ treaties contained a basic order, a closed
system which governed Community law in the same way that a domestic
constitution governs national law. With regard to the further steps towards
integration set for the future, he spoke of “planning constitutions” [“Planungsverfassungen”].
Later, after several amendments had been made to the treaties, Ipsen
referred to them as “changing constitutions” [“Wandelverfassungen”].
The 1980s saw an increasing tendency to characterise the treaties as
constitutions, particularly in light of the fact that the material regulated
by the treaties and the functions which they served were typically
constitutional. That view certainly saw the treaties as having a normative
constitutional character within the meaning generally understood by
constitutional theory. Today, this view is supported by the overwhelming
majority of commentators on European law. Moreover, initiatives taken by the
European Parliament in 1984 and 1994 have triggered debate on whether a new
constitution should be formally adopted.
[57]
49.
The European Court of Justice has consistently supported a constitutional
interpretation of treaty law. Its jurisprudence echoed both strong parallels
with those parts of domestic law which implement the principle of the rule of
law and a preoccupation with the construction of a discrete jurisprudential
system. In recent years, the 1986 Les Verts judgment and, in 1991, the Court’s
First Opinion on the European Economic Area Agreement have underlined (if not
explained or justified) the Court’s acquiescence in the constitutional
interpretation of the founding treaties. The Federal Constitutional Court has
referred to a “Community constitution” on several occasions. It has not
used the phrase in any technical sense, however, nor has it expressed an
opinion on how the treaties should properly be classified by constitutional
theory. A constitutional interpretation of the treaties has been
overwhelmingly rejected by commentators writing in the fields of national
constitutional law and general state theory (political theory [Allgemeine
Staatslehre])
[58]
,
however, primarily with the justification, drawn from various standard
concepts of the nature of a (domestic) constitution, that only a state can
have a constitution. According to a second objection, only a European people
comprising the European Union’s citizens as a whole would be capable of
issuing a European constitution, but the peoples of Europe have not yet
coalesced to a point where they can properly be described as a “European
people”. More rarely, it is claimed that only a European nation could issue
a European constitution. In the meantime, a
dispute has broken out over the
constitution of the European Union. It does not only concern concepts and
definitions, but also the importance of national constitutional law on the one
hand and primary Union law on the other. It is effectively a debate about the
importance of state and union als political institutions.
[59]
50.
Europe already faces one unavoidable consequence of integration, which
has lent the debate over a constitution for the European Union particular
significance: since there are forces at play within member states which are
not directly regulated by domestic constitutions, those constitutions function
less effectively as a guiding framework than would otherwise be the case.
Furthermore, the authority which domestic constitutions exercise over those
subject to their jurisdiction has been intermittently interrupted by
directives from another legal order which deviate from domestic constitutional
norms. The reduced significance of
domestic constitutions is particularly clear in the area of basic rights,
but it is also evident in material constitutional principles, and it can even
be detected in respect of special features of national constitutions which are
not in and of themselves related to any of the Union’s fields of activity.
One of the purposes of a constitution is integration, and integration is a
function which has been particularly significant for constitutional states in
the second half of the twentieth century. Yet the reduced significance of
domestic constitutions reduces their ability to perform that integrative
function. If the political system of which the Union is a part is to be able
to ensure what, in the member states, was once a given, the functional
deficiencies which are becoming evident in domestic constitutions will need to
be balanced by a counterpart at the Union level. The question of a new
constitution is particularly relevant in this context, since the European
Union’s current treaties fail to meet the standard required.
[60]
51.
B.
(I.) The central issue in the discussion about a European
constitution is whether the present European governing entity is capable of
having a constitution at all in its current form - whether, that is, it meets
the requirements for constitutional
capacity [Verfassungsfähigkeit] established by constitutional theory.
Since the constitution was conceived and realised as a distinct, legal
institution in the era of nation-states, it is traditionally linked to the
state as a form of organisation. Constitutional theory was developed within
the context of the nation-state; the historical adoptions of constitutions
which served as points of reference for constitutional theory all occurred in
states. Nowadays, the supranational union offers a form of organisation based
on public international law which resembles a state, but it is not clear
whether that resemblance alone is enough to justify applying the concept of a
constitution. Like a state, a union needs a securely anchored framework, that
allows but delimits development, giving,
in effect, the basic security which characterises the constitutional state.
Yet a union constitution would lag behind a state constitution both in terms
of its legitimacy (since it cannot be traced to a state people) and its
normative effect (since it would only be a complementary constitution, and
since its norms would not enjoy primacy over member states’ domestic law
within the meaning of a hierarchy of norms).
[61]
52.
Every conceivable solution to the problem of constitutional capacity
brings fresh problems in its wake. Accepting the possibility of a union
constitution places the “constitution”, used as a term of art, in danger
of dilution, and thus places the concept of a constitution in danger of
progressive devaluation. Ruling out the possibility of a union constitution
would mean, depending on the way in which the member states, in their capacity
as “masters of the treaties”, responded to the situation,
(i) temporary stagnation in the pace of integration, followed by a
trend towards centralism; or (ii) a premature and insufficiently prepared
transition to a geo-regional unification state; or (iii) a gradual
emasculation of the primacy of the constitution through ever-larger “constitution-free
zones”; or (iv) an increase in the supranational union’s complexity as a
result of the introduction of a legal institution which resembles a
constitution but whose potential consequences would be difficult to predict in
advance. Constitutional theory stands at a crossroads, and choosing its future
path is not a simple matter. The choice can be described as a constitutional
dilemma of supranational integration.
[62]
53.
The cautious inclusion
of certain non-state forms of organisation in constitutional theory is
suggested here as a solution to the constitutional dilemma described above. It
is necessary to distinguish between the usual forms of non-state organisation
(which, for several reasons, are incapable of a constitution) and those forms
where a pronounced similarity to a state justifies the adoption of the concept
of a constitution, concomitant difficulties notwithstanding. This solution
makes it possible to pursue constitutional theory’s central preoccupation
(providing for a reliable, basic political order and for the moderation, and
general orientation, of public power) even in the era of less significant,
integrated statehood, without modifying its core postulate (the basic idea
that any holder of power in a political community should be subject to higher
law). This solution is thus a continuation of constitutional theory, not a
falsification of its tenets. It permits the subjection of public power to
higher law to the greatest possible extent, even in the face of globalisation
and geo-regionalisation. Moreover, it recognises the need for a multicultural
organisation of integration to gather pre-state constitutional experience
which could provide the basis for the drafting of a state constitution at a
later date. It avoids the negative consequences which would arise if
integration were pursued in the absence of a constitution, but it does not
fail to heed the danger of relaxing the tenets of constitutional theory. It is
the least disadvantageous solution to the constitutional dilemma.
[63]
54.
From a dogmatic point of view, non-state organisations can be included in
constitutional theory by distinguishing between different types of constitution [Verfassungstypen] within a more
broadly defined concept of constitution. On the basis of the form of
organisation in question, three types of constitution need to be distinguished
thus far: the (sovereign) state constitution, the federated state
constitution, as common in federations, and - potentially - the union
constitution. While the essential tenets of constitutional theory apply to
each of these kinds of constitution, other constitutional precepts are valid
only for a particular sort, and require considerable adaptation before they
can be applied - if, indeed, they can be applied at all - to other
constitutional types. Including organisations which resemble states within
constitutional theory does not imply, then, that any conceivable union
constitution would be equivalent to the constitution of a state.
[64]
55.
Constitutional theory has seen no debate as yet over the conceptual
preconditions for constitutional capacity, since the concept of
constitutional capacity has not yet been introduced. Thus, constitutional
theory is only able to address the general meaning and purpose of a
constitution, and to examine those qualities of a state which are most
significant from that point of view. As indicated above, the central
preoccupation and core postulate of constitutional theory must dominate any
such investigation. The first requirement is an organisation (in other words,
a corporate body). A constitution is
restricted to one specific organisation in any case [Verbandsspezifität],
although that organisation can be a composite, encompassing others. It is not,
then, possible to speak of a “European Constitution” which is related to a
specific territory, or which unites the legally independent European
organisations of the EU, the Council of Europe and the OSCE within a single
constitutional order. Since a constitution is only relevant to highly
developed organisations which carry political weight, further conceptual
preconditions are a high degree of organisation and far-reaching competences.
The organisation must, further, reflect a (general) political union: the
institution of the constitution has been designed to establish the legal order
of human political communities, not to serve as a steering mechanism for
specialised organisations. The organisation must also enjoy significant autonomy
in fulfilling the tasks assigned to it, since the institution of the
constitution is designed to allow independent power structures to hold
themselves in check, not to enable the supervision of functionaries who merely
receive and carry out instructions. This means that organisations based on
international law will need to develop an autonomous
political will, independent of the individual political wills of member
states and their governments. A significant proportion of important decisions
must, therefore, fall to the organisation’s unitary organs or be subject to
the majority principle. Thus, if the 1966 Luxembourg Compromise were
understood as legally binding, it would be impossible to recognise the
European Communities’ constitutional capacity until the late 1980s. Finally,
since a constitution is also a fundamental legal document which guarantees
individual citizens the support and protection of the community,
constitutional capacity requires that an organisation draw upon a close
community of responsibility and solidarity which resembles the community of
common destiny [“Schicksalsgemeinschaft”] evident in the state. - As a
general rule, the supranational union fulfils these requirements. In
individual cases, however, constitutional capacity may be denied because the
founding treaty gives member states’ governments such far-reaching control
that reference to the autonomous fulfilment of duties becomes inappropriate.
[65]
56.
(II.) Value judgments play as significant a role in defining
the conceptual preconditions for a
constitution as they do in establishing the preconditions for
constitutional capacity, or, indeed, in resolving many other constitutional
questions. Stringently accurate statements are impossible, since the issues
involved cannot be resolved by logic alone. According to the theory proposed
here, it must be possible to identify the characteristics on which the
effectiveness of the constitution as a
legal institution depends. These characteristics are predominantly formal,
but it is possible to identify certain material characteristics among them.
Since a wholly formal (or wholly material) constitution cannot exist, a great
deal of what has been termed a “constitution” in European constitutional
debate is not really a constitution within the terms of constitutional theory
at all.
57.
There are only five formal requirements for a union constitution. First,
it must be possible to identify a set of norms enacted by a single, general
normative act: the constitution may not develop gradually or emerge as the
product of judge-made law. Secondly, the constitution must exist in written
form. It must, thirdly, have the status of superior law; a union constitution,
therefore, can only be a constitutional treaty. Fourthly, specific procedures
must be established for constitutional amendment. Fifthly, the constitution
must self-identify as a constitution. A union constitution has four material
preconditions. First, the union must be equipped with organs and
organisational law. Secondly, the relationship between the union and its
member states must be regulated exhaustively. This may include provisions
foreseeing sanctions for a crisis situation where a member state breaks out of
the constitutional framework. Thirdly, the appropriate organisational steps
must have been taken to provide for the requirements necessary at union level
for the creation of supranational public power. Finally, the union’s
philosophical and political compass must be clear.
[66]
58.
(III.) In a supranational union, the creation of a constitution poses a particular problem. For one
thing, the constituent authority (the creator of the constitution and holder
of constituent power [Verfassunggeber]) is to be determined quite differently
from the way it would be determined in a state. As a general rule, the
institution of the constitution is not restricted to a particular circle of
users: whoever succeeds in establishing and enforcing a set of norms which
enjoy the authority of a constitution (in the normative sense) is the
constituent authority. Where the state is concerned, our value system points
to the people as the appropriate holder of constituent power, but a
constitution can, in fact, be established by anyone in power. In the
supranational union, by contrast, constituent
power is reserved to the member
states: as the superior source of law in a constitutional organisation
which is itself based on public international law, the constitution must be
contained in the founding treaty, which has to be designed as a constitutional
treaty [Verfassungsvertrag]. According to public international law, only
states are invested with the legal power to create such treaties. States may
opt to include others in the treaty-making process, but the act of adopting a
constitution - the conclusion of the treaty, which is the act giving rise to
constitutional norms - is theirs, and theirs alone. Popular constituent power
within the meaning of that term in democratic constitutional theory does not
and cannot exist in a constitutional organisation which is itself based on
international law.
[67]
59.
None of this should be understood to mean that there is no place for
popular participation in the process of adopting a constitution. From the
perspective of democratic constitutional theory, the legitimacy of the union’s
constitution needs to approximate that of a constitution based on popular
constituent power as closely as possible. In addition, from the point of view
of political theory, the union constitution must have a significant power of
integration, since it needs to complement the weakened integrative power of
member states’ constitutions effectively (supra). It would be useful, in
light of these criteria, to adopt a parallel procedure in which the conclusion
of the treaty is accompanied by specific measures which ensure legitimacy and
integrative power. One step of that parallel procedure would be a double
referendum in which citizens are asked both for their approval of the
union constitution in their capacity as citizens of the union and, in their
capacity as citizens of a member state, whether that state should ratify the
constitutional treaty. From the point of view of democratic theory, the
referendum’s participants are acting as members of two peoples: the national
people of the state [Staatsvolk] and the people
of the union [Unionsvolk] which, while it is not a people of a state, is
nonetheless a general political community, and therefore fully able to secure
its governing entity democratic legitimacy. In another step, a preparatory
constitutional assembly must be called into being. Its work must be
accompanied and supported by a broad public discussion. Supportive measures must be taken to ensure that a public constitutional discussion is held throughout the
union. In light of these steps, a preparatory treaty is advisable to deal
with the modalities of the adoption of a constitution.
[68]
60.
Constitutional amendments represent a further specific problem. At first glance,
the distinction between constituent power and amending power seems to pose
difficulties for a supranational union. International treaties like a
constitutional treaty of union are usually altered by their signatories (the
member states) in the same way that they were concluded, and they may
generally be amended as the signatories see fit. But the law of treaties does
envisage other procedures by which treaties may be changed (sc. art. 40(1)
Vienna Convention) - amendment by a qualified majority of signatories, for
example, or an autonomous amendment to the treaty provisions by the union’s
organs. In this context, the distinction between constituent and amending
power is free of difficulty, since the power to amend the treaty is
restricted, and derives from the treaty itself. Three different procedures for
constitutional amendment are suggested here. They vary according to the
magnitude of change envisaged, but each of them foresees the participation of
the people of the union or its representatives. According to this suggestion,
insignificant amendments could be made without member states’ unanimous consent.
61.
Since the member states are “masters of the treaty”, they can ignore
the provisions made in the constitutional treaty regarding the amendment
procedure. Equally, they can ignore the (written and unwritten) limits to
constitutional amendment. By virtue of their sovereignty, member states enjoy
the power to conclude treaties, and that power is not limited where a union’s
founding treaty has been designed as a constitutional treaty. A treaty of
amendment set outside the framework of the constitutional treaty would,
therefore, be valid at public international law. Nonetheless, it would imply a
complete break with the old constitutional order, and hence also at least a
tacit repeal of the constitution, or, indeed, the adoption of a new
constitution. The democratic legitimacy obtained from the lengthy parallel
procedure for the old constitution (for the treaty of union qua constitutional
treaty, in other words) would thereby be lost.
[69]
62.
C.
The
European Union’s founding treaties do not have constitutional status, even though they would easily fulfil most of the
requirements for a constitution. Until the penalty payment mechanism was
introduced (art. 171(2) [today 228(2)] EC Treaty, 143(2) EURATOM Treaty),
no sanctions were in place with which member states who were committing grave
breaches of treaty could be compelled to return to the conventional
constitutional order. The lack of sanctions left unanswered questions which
were integral to the proper functioning of the community as a whole. Nor,
until the Amsterdam reforms, were the Union’s fundamental values and ideas
encapsulated in written form (cf. now art. 6(1) TEU). Only one necessary
characteristic of a constitution is still absent today: nowhere do the Union’s
founding documents acknowledge their own constitutional character. The effect
of self-identifying as a constitution in
this way should not be
underestimated: it reflects member states’ readiness to accept a
constitution for their organisation of integration, and hence to accept the
increased political import which would accrue to the organisation once such a
step had been taken. Thus far, that readiness has been lacking.
[70]
63.
D.
One of the greatest challenges of the current decade
will be the creation of a European Union constitution. It is timely, then, to
establish criteria for the constitution
of a supranational union.
64.
(I.) A general constitutional theory of the supranational
union will focus on conceptual and drafting requirements. A union’s
constitution will need to fulfil the same functions as the constitution of a
state (except those functions which are directly linked to the status of the
constituted entity as a state). It must also provide a framework within which
the union’s own dynamic nature can evolve, reconciling continuity with
change while respecting its own nature as an international treaty subject to
public international law. All of this needs to be accomplished in several
languages simultaneously: the treaty’s versions must, as nearly as possible,
be identical, while remaining clear and comprehensible. This is more than
would be required of a state constitution. The emphasis should thus be, not on
adopting a constitution as quickly as possible, but on ensuring that the
constitution which is eventually adopted has been thoroughly thought through.
65.
Transparency is an important criterion. A supranational union is
necessarily a complicated affair, but its constitution should not be permitted
to complicate matters further. There should only be a single, readily
comprehensible constitutional document for a single governing entity with a
single legal personality and a coherent comprehensible set of organs.
Provision should be made for a limited number of structurally simple
decision-making procedures; if necessary, a certain degree of efficiency may
need to be sacrificed to that goal. Since supranational unions are dynamic, a
union constitution is a “changing constitution” [Wandelverfassung] which
must be more frequently adapted to changing problems and perspectives than the
constitution of a state. Its design should thus follow a technical concept
which facilitates alterations. A union constitution should have a consistent modular structure
in which regulations of similar or related issues are concentrated in closed
sets of norms as far as practicable. It would be useful, for example, to
concentrate important procedural norms in a single module.
66.
It is important, too, that the constitution be comprehensible. Constitutions, whether national or supranational,
are not the domain of specialists. Rather, they speak to all jurists, who will need to respect constitutional norms in
creating, applying and elaborating other law, and they also speak to the
citizens within their area of application. The structure of the union
constitution and its provisions should thus be as straightforward as possible.
Like national constitutions, a union constitution should make generous use of
open norms, refraining as far as possible from bureaucratic details. The linguistic
style employed in the constitution should
invite its addressees to identify
with it: a constitution is not just a body of regulations, but a political
manifesto whose content should invite individuals to identify with the
community.
67.
In their current form, the European Union’s founding treaties fall so
far short of these requirements that transforming and collating them into a
constitutional treaty without far-reaching reform seems a questionable goal.
If a European constitution were adopted, a significant part of the Union’s
primary law would need to be re-formulated. Part three of the EC Treaty, which
regulates the coummunity policies, does, however, give partial effect to the
criterion that the constitution of a supranational union should have a modular
structure.
[71]
68.
From the point of view of a general constitutional theory for the
supranational union, requirements governing the subject-matter of a
constitution also obtain. The first of these is the requirement, discussed
above, for a homogeneity clause. Certain fundamental
matters must also be regulated (for example the question of the union’s
legal personality, basic duties of membership, the issue of mutual loyalty
within the union and the basics of the allocation of competences). But the
union’s constitution should also address fundamental matters in the strict
sense: it should contain those legal norms which are a sine qua non if the
union is to be able to function as a supranational organisation of
integration. The European Communities and the European Union have had to
resolve most of these issues incrementally on the basis of judge-made law. A
constitution would need, therefore, to address the direct validity of union
law at the domestic level, the independence of the national and supranational
legal orders and the primacy of union law. It would also need to contain
measures with which union law could, if necessary, be enforced: it would need
to include sanctions. These could
certainly go beyond those already in place in the European Union. Further, the
constitution should contain preventive
measures with which union law could be enforced on a day-to-day basis. For
example, the constitution might provide for the direct application of union
directives once a certain period has elapsed, or for strict state liability by
union law. Finally, the constitution of a supranational union must also
regulate the accession, secession and expulsion of member states, establishing
substantive and procedural norms. - By contrast, the dynamic nature of the
union makes it impracticable to establish general criteria for the system of
competences. Drafting competence norms requires care in order to ensure that
they are not subjected to overly generous interpretation. The principle of
subsidiarity is essentially useful as a principle of political theory in order
to allocate and distribute competences.
[72]
69.
(II.)
Special requirements for the constitution of a free and
democratic supranational union are considered here only in overview, with
attention given to general approaches and certain particular aspects. If
organisational union law is to be able to give effect to the principle of
democracy at the union level, it will need to ensure that democratic
legitimacy is accomplished first and foremost through the people of the union
and that people’s representatives, while the additional, more distant and
thus lesser legitimacy deriving from the peoples of member states and their
representative parliaments is merely complementary (primacy
of democratic legitimacy through the people of the union).
As integration progresses, the political centre will eventually need to
shift from the council, which is a federal organ, to the union’s parliament,
and, to some extent, to other organs of the union which are elected (or at
least indirectly legitimated) by the people of the union. From the perspective
of democratic theory, however, the additional legitimacy provided by state
peoples through their governments in the council makes a relatively long
transition period acceptable, with the proviso that significant measures
cannot be taken during this period without the consent of the union’s
parliament. Since the union’s parliament must be suitable for that task, the
European Parliament will need to be altered so that it no longer comprises
representatives “of the peoples of the States brought together in the
Community” (art. 189 EC Treaty, 107 EURATOM Treaty, 20 ECSC Treaty), but “of
the people of the Union”. Furthermore, the unequal
allocation of seats to the member states ‑ unequal because it
is disproportional to the populations of the member states - must
be reduced as progress is made
towards integration.
[73]
70.
In order to implement the fundamental value of human rights / human
dignity, the union’s constitution must guarantee basic rights and ensure
their effective protection. The constitution will thus need a comprehensive article addressing basic rights. That article should
not merely content itself with ensuring that the appropriate legal mechanisms
are in place: its wording should also invite those who read it to identify
with the union, as the constitution’s integrative function requires. By
contrast, an elaborate catalogue of
basic rights will only be appropriate if it is the result of an intensive
process of exploration and consolidation of the union’s identity, widely and
actively supported by the public. The White Papers produced by the Convention
instituted by the European Council should not, therefore, automatically result
in the enactment of a catalogue of basic rights. Rather, they should serve as
the basis for a European discussion of basic rights. The practice of signing
international conventions on human rights is not called into question,
however, since it provides additional protection for human rights. In
particular, it is no less appropriate for the European Union to ratify the European Convention on Human Rights in complement to its own basic rights system than it is for its
member states to do so.
71.
To ensure that the rule of law governs the application of competence
norms, the constitution of a free and democratic supranational union should
not contain subsidiary supplementary competence norms which follow the example
of arts. 235 (now art. 308) EC Treaty, 203 EURATOM Treaty, 95 ECSC Treaty. If
norms of that kind are included, they should, at the very least, be tied to
restrictive material and formal criteria, so that their effect is mitigated by
the rule of law. It would also be worth considering introducing an extraordinary
right of appeal for member states in questions of competence, according to
which the Court of Justice would be required to re-hear a competence question
in a special procedure, sitting with an extended bench (with judges drawn from
member states’ supreme or constitutional courts, for example). Implementing
the ideal of the social state as a fundamental value of the union will require
that the constitution contain either a general principle of social justice and
welfare or social basic rights, in order to counterbalance the effect of those
structural principles of economic policy and those basic rights and freedoms
which are directed towards free economic activity. Appropriate competences and
financing instruments must also be provided for. However, social pressure is a
significant element of the defence of social justice and welfare in
supranational union and state alike. A supranational union’s constitution
can play only a supporting role - for example, by emphasising the
socio-political role played by unionwide interest groups like trade unions,
employers’ federations, professional groups, etc, in the way that Art. 191
EC Treaty already does for political parties.
[74]
72.
In the following work, a picture of a new form of organisation emerges.
It is a complicated and unusual form of organisation. Again and again, it
demands a high degree of intellectual effort from anyone trying to come to
grips with it. Yet Europeans wanted the strength of a geo-regional community
in response to the challenges of geo-regionalisation and globalisation, but
refused to question their fundamental values or forfeit national
idiosyncrasies. They have found a solution which largely achieves the former
without sacrificing the latter,
opening the prospect of a gentle transition to a federal European state. The
corollorary is, however, that politics, practice and scholarship will need to
keep rising to the challenges posed by the exigencies of transfer and
innovation, breaking up, adapting and extending traditional, closed
conceptions of legal science and political theory. But how could anyone expect
such a solution to be easy?
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[57]
4-A.I.1.
[58]
The term is glossed above, no. 7, footnote 8.
[59]
4-A.I.2/3.
[60]
4-A.II/III.
[61]
4-B.I.1.
[62]
4-B.I.2.
[63]
4-B.I.3.a/b.
[64]
4-B.I.3.c.
[65]
4-B.I.3.d.
[66]
4-B.II.
[67]
4-B.III.1.
[68]
4-B.III.2.
[69]
4-B.III.3.
[70]
4-C.
[71]
4-D.I.1.
[72]
4-D.I.2.
[73]
4-D.II.2.a.
[74]
4-D.II.2.b-d.
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